Commit Graph
18 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
norris@netscape.com 7116dbbb79 Fix 25062 Reload vulnerability
25206 Reload vulnerability #2
Implement grant dialogs and persistence for capabilities.
most r=mstoltz, some code from morse w/ r=norris
2000-02-10 04:56:56 +00:00
norris@netscape.com 0085b5a148 Fix bug #25864 watch() vulnerability
r=vidur,rogerl
2000-02-02 00:22:58 +00:00
norris@netscape.com aff32ff13b Files:
caps/include/nsScriptSecurityManager.h
	caps/src/nsScriptSecurityManager.cpp
	modules/libpref/src/init/all.js
Fix
24565 nsScriptSecurityManager::GetSecurityLevel() is a performance
24567 re-write DOM glue security checks to avoid NS_WITH_SERVICE()
r=waterson

Files:
	dom/src/base/nsGlobalWindow.cpp
	layout/base/src/nsDocument.cpp
	layout/base/src/nsGenericElement.cpp
Fix assertion failure for 1-character property names.


Files:
	dom/src/jsurl/nsJSProtocolHandler.cpp
	webshell/src/nsDocLoader.cpp
Fix 18653 "javascript:" URLs cross windows problems (probably regressi
r=nisheeth

Files:
	layout/events/src/nsEventListenerManager.cpp
Fix
23834 document.onkeypress allows sniffing keystrokes
24152 document.onclick shows links from other window
r=joki
2000-01-23 04:23:14 +00:00
mstoltz@netscape.com c43bbcb494 Implemented the reading of capabilities data from prefs. Reads codebase and certificate principal data and populates ScriptSecurityManager's principals table. bug= 18122 r=norris, rginda 2000-01-18 21:54:01 +00:00
norris@netscape.com afc0ddf1db Fix
858  [Feature] JavaScript auto-disable per-domain RFE
    13023 Users must be able to disable Java and JavaScript (for JS in mail)
    21923 Executing functions in "chrome:" protocol - #2.
    r=mstoltz

    (Checked in with red on Mac; Wan-Teh says his changes are localized so
     it shouldn't interfere with his fixing bustage.)
2000-01-08 16:51:54 +00:00
norris@netscape.com 009f3274b5 Fix 22909 previousSibling vulnerability
r=mstoltz
2000-01-06 00:59:18 +00:00
norris@netscape.com b84f4e2755 Fix 18553 [DOGFOOD] addEventListener allows sniffing keystrokes
Add checks to nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckCanListenTo that take
a principal and ensure that the currently executing script code
either is from the same origin as that principal or has the
UniversalBrowserRead privilege enabled. (chrome code has all
privileges enabled by default.) It's okay for the principal passed in
to be null. That just signifies a privileged window/document that only
can be listened to with privileges.

I added GetPrincipal/SetPrincipal methods to nsIEventListenerManager.
nsDocument::GetNewListenerManager sets a principal on the listener
manager when it creates one. Obviously there are other places that
create listener managers, but scripts seem to go through this one.

Another change is to save some memory usage. Currently I allocate an
array of PolicyType that is NS_DOM_PROP_MAX elements long.
Unfortunately, compilers appear to allocate four bytes for each
PolicyType, so the array takes around 2400 bytes. I've added changes
to use two bit vectors that should consume about 1/16 that space.

r=joki

There are also changes that push nsnull onto the JSContext stack when
entering a nested event loop.

r=jband
1999-11-25 05:28:18 +00:00
norris@netscape.com 3a10ca92b3 Modify generated dom code to use a enum rather than a string for codesize
and efficiency.
Tighten checks on document properties and node properties. Should resolve
several bugs:
18965 document.firstChild vulnerability
19043 document.childNodes vulnerability
19044 document.lastChild vulnerability
r=mstoltz
1999-11-20 07:28:34 +00:00
norris@netscape.com 6e920731f8 * Fix 12124 [DOGFOOD] Reading user's preferences
* Implement site-specific security policies (bug 858)
r=mstoltz
* Use Recycle rather than delete[] to clean up Purify logs
r=law
1999-11-16 05:07:31 +00:00
norris@netscape.com 8a798cc0c6 * Fix the following bugs by tightening the default security policy.
17977 [DOGFOOD] Reading documents using document.body
17538 document.lastModified is exposed
17537 document.images vulnerabilities
16036 [DOGFOOD] document.Element exposes the DOM of documents from
15757 [DOGFOOD] Injecting JS code using setAttribute and getElemen
15550 Injecting text in documents from any domain using createText
15067 [DOGFOOD] getElementsByTagName() allows reading of arbitrary
* Create an array of dom property policy types and initialize it when the script security manager is created.
* Move some implementation code to a new shared implementation base class.
* Implement privilege enabling, disabling and reverting
* Implement stack walking for checking privileges.
r=mstoltz@netscape.com

* Modify nsIPref to support security policy work.
r=neeti@netscape.com
1999-11-11 22:10:36 +00:00
dmose@mozilla.org 20621227af updated xPL license boilerplate to v1.1, a=chofmann@netscape.com,r=endico@mozilla.org 1999-11-06 03:43:54 +00:00
norris@netscape.com c8e1a7cf06 work on bug 7270.
r=mstoltz.
Implement netscape.security.PrivilegeManager callbacks.
1999-10-28 22:09:03 +00:00
norris@netscape.com 42ef17ba9f Add ability to disable JS. Fix 13978 shopping at webvan.com crashes 1999-09-17 20:13:52 +00:00
norris@netscape.com a011b21cd4 * Add checks on urls formed from web scripts
* Make nsScriptSecurityManager implement nsXPCSecurityManager
* Fix unix warnings
1999-09-07 02:54:19 +00:00
norris@netscape.com cacfd30873 Add all-powerful system principals. Remove some dead code from the build. 1999-09-01 00:54:35 +00:00
norris@netscape.com 4081075779 * clean up nsScriptSecurityManager
* remove nsJSSecurityManager
* save principals in nsIChannels and nsIDocuments
1999-08-29 21:58:42 +00:00
mccabe@netscape.com e2fb25668d Spam caps subtree to replace declarations of IDL-defined interface methods in implementation classes with xpidl-generated NS_DECL_NSIFOO macro. 1999-08-21 20:22:27 +00:00
arielb@netscape.com 6c4186e530 includes updates to codbase matching security checks currently turned off
but in place.  redefined the script security manager in caps and it is
now generating codebase principals.
1999-08-20 09:51:02 +00:00