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caec8eadf94de1a1028c08b72ca34210649755d2
sousa-gecko/dom/webauthn/WebAuthnUtil.cpp
T
Nika Layzell 2cc40506ae Bug 2022249 - Part 2: Pull nsITransportSecurityInfo directly from channel in WindowGlobalParent, r=keeler 
This leverages the new features added in part 1 to make us fetch
nsITransportSecurityInfo directly from the channel in the parent process when
used for WindowGlobalParent.

Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D288929
2026-06-11 15:46:21 +00:00

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25 KiB
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/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file,
* You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "mozilla/dom/WebAuthnUtil.h"
#include "hasht.h"
#include "js/Exception.h"
#include "mozilla/Base64.h"
#include "mozilla/BasePrincipal.h"
#include "mozilla/Components.h"
#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_security.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/WebAuthenticationBinding.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/WindowGlobalParent.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/nsMixedContentBlocker.h"
#include "mozilla/extensions/MatchPattern.h"
#include "mozilla/extensions/WebExtensionPolicy.h"
#include "mozilla/net/DNS.h"
#include "mozpkix/pkixutil.h"
#include "nsComponentManagerUtils.h"
#include "nsContentUtils.h"
#include "nsHTMLDocument.h"
#include "nsICryptoHash.h"
#include "nsIEffectiveTLDService.h"
#include "nsIURIMutator.h"
#include "nsNetUtil.h"
namespace mozilla::dom {
bool IsValidAppId(const nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal>& aPrincipal,
const nsCString& aAppId) {
// An AppID is a substitute for the RP ID that allows the caller to assert
// credentials that were created using the legacy U2F protocol. While an RP ID
// is the caller origin's effective domain, or a registrable suffix thereof,
// an AppID is a URL (with a scheme and a possibly non-empty path) that is
// same-site with the caller's origin.
//
// The U2F protocol nominally uses Algorithm 3.1.2 of [1] to validate AppIDs.
// However, the WebAuthn spec [2] notes that it is not necessary to "implement
// steps four and onward of" Algorithm 3.1.2. Instead, in step three, "the
// comparison on the host is relaxed to accept hosts on the same site." Step
// two is best seen as providing a default value for the AppId when one is not
// provided. That leaves step 1 and the same-site check, which is what we
// implement here.
//
// [1]
// https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-id-20180227/fido-appid-and-facets-v2.0-id-20180227.html#determining-if-a-caller-s-facetid-is-authorized-for-an-appid
// [2] https://w3c.github.io/webauthn/#sctn-appid-extension
auto* principal = BasePrincipal::Cast(aPrincipal);
bool reqIsFromExtension = !!principal->AddonPolicy();
if (reqIsFromExtension) {
// AppIDs are not allowed from extensions.
return false;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> callerUri;
nsresult rv = principal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(callerUri));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return false;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> appIdUri;
rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(appIdUri), aAppId);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return false;
}
// Step 1 of Algorithm 3.1.2. "If the AppID is not an HTTPS URL, and matches
// the FacetID of the caller, no additional processing is necessary and the
// operation may proceed." In the web context, the "FacetID" is defined as
// "the Web Origin [RFC6454] of the web page triggering the FIDO operation,
// written as a URI with an empty path. Default ports are omitted and any path
// component is ignored."
if (!appIdUri->SchemeIs("https")) {
nsCString facetId;
rv = principal->GetWebExposedOriginSerialization(facetId);
return NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && facetId == aAppId;
}
// Same site check
nsCOMPtr<nsIEffectiveTLDService> tldService =
do_GetService(NS_EFFECTIVETLDSERVICE_CONTRACTID);
if (!tldService) {
return false;
}
nsAutoCString baseDomainCaller;
rv = tldService->GetBaseDomain(callerUri, 0, baseDomainCaller);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return false;
}
nsAutoCString baseDomainAppId;
rv = tldService->GetBaseDomain(appIdUri, 0, baseDomainAppId);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return false;
}
if (baseDomainCaller == baseDomainAppId) {
return true;
}
// Exceptions for Google Accounts from Bug 1436078. These were supposed to be
// temporary, but users reported breakage when we tried to remove them (Bug
// 1822703). We will need to keep them indefinitely.
if (baseDomainCaller.EqualsLiteral("google.com") &&
(aAppId.Equals("https://www.gstatic.com/securitykey/origins.json"_ns) ||
aAppId.Equals(
"https://www.gstatic.com/securitykey/a/google.com/origins.json"_ns))) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
nsresult DefaultRpId(const nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal>& aPrincipal,
/* out */ nsACString& aRpId) {
// [https://w3c.github.io/webauthn/#rp-id]
// "By default, the RP ID for a WebAuthn operation is set to the caller's
// origin's effective domain."
auto* basePrin = BasePrincipal::Cast(aPrincipal);
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
if (NS_FAILED(basePrin->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri)))) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
return uri->GetAsciiHost(aRpId);
}
bool IsWebAuthnAllowedInDocument(const nsCOMPtr<Document>& aDoc) {
MOZ_ASSERT(aDoc);
return aDoc->IsHTMLOrXHTML();
}
bool IsWebAuthnAllowedInContext(WindowGlobalParent* aContext) {
nsIPrincipal* principal = aContext->DocumentPrincipal();
MOZ_ASSERT(principal);
if (principal->GetIsNullPrincipal()) {
return false;
}
if (principal->GetIsIpAddress()) {
return false;
}
// This next test is not strictly necessary since CredentialsContainer is
// [SecureContext] in our webidl.
if (!principal->GetIsOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy()) {
return false;
}
if (principal->GetIsLoopbackHost()) {
return true;
}
if (StaticPrefs::security_webauthn_allow_with_certificate_override()) {
return true;
}
WindowGlobalParent* windowContext = aContext;
while (windowContext) {
if (nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> chan = windowContext->GetDocumentChannel()) {
nsCOMPtr<nsITransportSecurityInfo> securityInfo;
nsresult rv = chan->GetSecurityInfo(getter_AddRefs(securityInfo));
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && securityInfo &&
!IsWebAuthnAllowedForTransportSecurityInfo(securityInfo)) {
return false;
}
}
windowContext = windowContext->GetParentWindowContext();
}
return true;
}
bool IsWebAuthnAllowedForTransportSecurityInfo(
nsITransportSecurityInfo* aSecurityInfo) {
nsITransportSecurityInfo::OverridableErrorCategory overridableErrorCategory;
if (!aSecurityInfo || NS_FAILED(aSecurityInfo->GetOverridableErrorCategory(
&overridableErrorCategory))) {
return false;
}
switch (overridableErrorCategory) {
case nsITransportSecurityInfo::OverridableErrorCategory::ERROR_UNSET:
return true;
case nsITransportSecurityInfo::OverridableErrorCategory::ERROR_TIME:
return true;
case nsITransportSecurityInfo::OverridableErrorCategory::ERROR_TRUST:
return false;
case nsITransportSecurityInfo::OverridableErrorCategory::ERROR_DOMAIN:
return false;
default:
return false;
}
}
// The "is a registrable domain suffix of or is equal to" condition is defined
// in https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/browsers.html#dom-document-domain
// as a subroutine of the document.domain setter, and it is exposed in XUL as
// the Document::IsValidDomain function. Unfortunately Document::IsValidDomain
// takes URIs, and to support web extensions we need to compare directly with
// ASCII host names.
bool IsRegistrableDomainSuffixOfOrEqualTo(const nsACString& aQuery,
const nsACString& aReference) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIEffectiveTLDService> tldService =
mozilla::components::EffectiveTLD::Service();
if (!tldService) {
return false;
}
// exclude values that are themselves in the public suffix list.
nsAutoCString queryPublicSuffix;
nsresult rv =
tldService->GetKnownPublicSuffixFromHost(aQuery, queryPublicSuffix);
if (NS_FAILED(rv) || aQuery == queryPublicSuffix) {
return false;
}
if (aQuery.Equals(aReference)) {
return true;
}
if (aQuery.Length() > aReference.Length() &&
StringEndsWith(aQuery, aReference) &&
aQuery.CharAt(aQuery.Length() - aReference.Length() - 1) == '.') {
// The query string ends with '.' followed by the reference string. It is a
// registrable domain suffix of the reference string if and only if its base
// domain is entirely contained in `aReference`.
nsAutoCString queryBaseDomain;
rv = tldService->GetBaseDomainFromHost(aQuery, 0, queryBaseDomain);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return false;
}
return aReference.Length() >= queryBaseDomain.Length();
}
return false;
}
static bool OriginCanClaimRpId(const nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal>& aPrincipal,
const nsACString& aRpId) {
// This checks two of the conditions defined in
// https://w3c.github.io/webauthn/#rp-id, namely that the RP ID value is
// (1) "a valid domain string", and
// (2) "a registrable domain suffix of or is equal to the caller's origin's
// effective domain"
//
// The specification also requires
// (3) Either "the origin's scheme is https" or "the origin's host is
// localhost and its scheme is http".
// We relax this third condition slightly and expose WebAuthn in all secure
// contexts (https://www.w3.org/TR/secure-contexts/).
// Condition (1)
nsAutoCString normalizedRpId;
nsresult rv = NS_DomainToASCII(aRpId, normalizedRpId);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return false;
}
if (normalizedRpId != aRpId) {
return false;
}
// Condition (2)
auto* basePrin = BasePrincipal::Cast(aPrincipal);
nsAutoCString current;
if (NS_FAILED(basePrin->GetAsciiHost(current))) {
return false;
}
if (!IsRegistrableDomainSuffixOfOrEqualTo(current, aRpId)) {
return false;
}
// Condition (3)
if (!aPrincipal->GetIsOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy()) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
static bool ExtensionCanClaimRpId(const nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal>& aPrincipal,
const nsACString& aRpId) {
// The conditions here are largely the same as in OriginCanClaimRpId. However,
// rather than making direct comparisons with the caller's origin, we check
// whether the extension has host permissions for a suitable origin via
// WebExtensionPolicy::CanAccessURI (which checks the restricted URI list).
//
// The conditions that we enforce are:
// (1) The RP ID must be a valid domain string.
// (2) The RP ID must not be a single-label non-loopback hostname or a known
// public suffix.
// (3) The extension must have host permissions for either
// - https://<aRpId>, or
// - http://<aRpId>, if aRpId is a loopback hostname (per
// mozilla::net::IsLoopbackHostname).
// Condition (1)
nsAutoCString normalizedRpId;
nsresult rv = NS_DomainToASCII(aRpId, normalizedRpId);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return false;
}
if (normalizedRpId != aRpId) {
return false;
}
// Condition (2)
nsCOMPtr<nsIEffectiveTLDService> tldService =
mozilla::components::EffectiveTLD::Service();
if (!tldService) {
return false;
}
nsAutoCString rpIdPublicSuffix;
if (NS_FAILED(
tldService->GetKnownPublicSuffixFromHost(aRpId, rpIdPublicSuffix))) {
return false;
}
if (aRpId == rpIdPublicSuffix) {
return false;
}
// Exclude single-label non-loopback hostnames.
int32_t firstDot = aRpId.FindChar('.');
if ((firstDot < 0 || firstDot == (int32_t)aRpId.Length() - 1) &&
!mozilla::net::IsLoopbackHostname(aRpId)) {
return false;
}
// Condition (3)
auto* basePrin = BasePrincipal::Cast(aPrincipal);
MOZ_ASSERT(basePrin->AddonPolicy());
nsAutoCString httpsUriSpec("https://"_ns);
httpsUriSpec.Append(aRpId);
httpsUriSpec.AppendLiteral("/");
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(uri), httpsUriSpec);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return false;
}
if (basePrin->AddonPolicy()->CanAccessURI(uri.get())) {
return true;
}
if (mozilla::net::IsLoopbackHostname(aRpId)) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> httpUri;
rv = NS_MutateURI(uri).SetScheme("http"_ns).Finalize(
getter_AddRefs(httpUri));
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) &&
basePrin->AddonPolicy()->CanAccessURI(httpUri.get())) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
bool IsValidRpId(const nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal>& aPrincipal,
const nsACString& aRpId) {
auto* basePrincipal = BasePrincipal::Cast(aPrincipal);
bool reqIsFromExtension = !!basePrincipal->AddonPolicy();
if (reqIsFromExtension) {
return ExtensionCanClaimRpId(aPrincipal, aRpId);
}
return OriginCanClaimRpId(aPrincipal, aRpId);
}
nsresult GetWebAuthnClientDataOrigin(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
/* out */ nsACString& aOrigin) {
auto* basePrincipal = BasePrincipal::Cast(aPrincipal);
bool reqIsFromExtension = !!basePrincipal->AddonPolicy();
if (reqIsFromExtension) {
nsAutoCString extensionId;
basePrincipal->AddonPolicy()->Id()->ToUTF8String(extensionId);
nsTArray<uint8_t> hashedId;
nsresult rv = HashCString(extensionId, hashedId);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
// The extension ID may not be a valid host string. So we use the sha256
// hash of the extension ID encoded in base 16 with the digits [a-p].
aOrigin.Assign("moz-extension://");
for (uint8_t byte : hashedId) {
aOrigin.Append(char('a' + ((byte >> 4) & 0x0F)));
aOrigin.Append(char('a' + (byte & 0x0F)));
}
return NS_OK;
}
return basePrincipal->GetWebExposedOriginSerialization(aOrigin);
}
static nsresult HashCString(nsICryptoHash* aHashService, const nsACString& aIn,
/* out */ nsTArray<uint8_t>& aOut) {
MOZ_ASSERT(aHashService);
nsresult rv = aHashService->Init(nsICryptoHash::SHA256);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
return rv;
}
rv = aHashService->Update(
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(aIn.BeginReading()), aIn.Length());
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
return rv;
}
nsAutoCString fullHash;
// Passing false below means we will get a binary result rather than a
// base64-encoded string.
rv = aHashService->Finish(false, fullHash);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
return rv;
}
aOut.Clear();
aOut.AppendElements(reinterpret_cast<uint8_t const*>(fullHash.BeginReading()),
fullHash.Length());
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult HashCString(const nsACString& aIn, /* out */ nsTArray<uint8_t>& aOut) {
nsresult srv;
nsCOMPtr<nsICryptoHash> hashService =
do_CreateInstance(NS_CRYPTO_HASH_CONTRACTID, &srv);
if (NS_FAILED(srv)) {
return srv;
}
srv = HashCString(hashService, aIn, aOut);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(srv))) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
return NS_OK;
}
uint32_t WebAuthnTimeout(const Optional<uint32_t>& aTimeout) {
uint32_t adjustedTimeout = 30000;
if (aTimeout.WasPassed()) {
adjustedTimeout = aTimeout.Value();
adjustedTimeout = std::max(15000u, adjustedTimeout);
adjustedTimeout = std::min(120000u, adjustedTimeout);
}
return adjustedTimeout;
}
static nsresult SerializeWebAuthnData(
const OwningArrayBufferViewOrArrayBuffer& aData, nsString& aOut) {
return ProcessTypedArrays(
aData, [&](const Span<uint8_t>& aData, JS::AutoCheckCannotGC&&) {
nsAutoCString result;
nsresult rv = mozilla::Base64URLEncode(
aData.Length(), aData.Elements(),
Base64URLEncodePaddingPolicy::Omit, result);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
aOut.Assign(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(result));
}
return rv;
});
}
nsresult SerializeWebAuthnCreationOptions(
JSContext* aCx, const nsString& aRpId,
const PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions& aOptions, nsString& aOut) {
nsresult rv;
PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptionsJSON json;
json.mRp.mId.Construct(aRpId);
json.mRp.mName.Assign(aOptions.mRp.mName);
json.mUser.mName.Assign(aOptions.mUser.mName);
rv = SerializeWebAuthnData(aOptions.mUser.mId, json.mUser.mId);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
json.mUser.mDisplayName.Assign(aOptions.mUser.mDisplayName);
rv = SerializeWebAuthnData(aOptions.mChallenge, json.mChallenge);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
json.mPubKeyCredParams = aOptions.mPubKeyCredParams;
json.mTimeout.Construct(WebAuthnTimeout(aOptions.mTimeout));
for (const auto& excludeCredential : aOptions.mExcludeCredentials) {
PublicKeyCredentialDescriptorJSON* excludeCredentialJSON =
json.mExcludeCredentials.AppendElement(fallible);
if (!excludeCredentialJSON) {
return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
excludeCredentialJSON->mType = excludeCredential.mType;
rv = SerializeWebAuthnData(excludeCredential.mId,
excludeCredentialJSON->mId);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (excludeCredential.mTransports.WasPassed()) {
excludeCredentialJSON->mTransports.Construct(
excludeCredential.mTransports.Value());
}
}
json.mAuthenticatorSelection.Construct(aOptions.mAuthenticatorSelection);
json.mHints = aOptions.mHints;
json.mAttestation = aOptions.mAttestation;
AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputsJSON& extensionsJSON =
json.mExtensions.Construct();
if (aOptions.mExtensions.mAppid.WasPassed()) {
extensionsJSON.mAppid.Construct(aOptions.mExtensions.mAppid.Value());
}
if (aOptions.mExtensions.mCredentialProtectionPolicy.WasPassed()) {
extensionsJSON.mCredentialProtectionPolicy.Construct(
aOptions.mExtensions.mCredentialProtectionPolicy.Value());
}
if (aOptions.mExtensions.mEnforceCredentialProtectionPolicy.WasPassed()) {
extensionsJSON.mEnforceCredentialProtectionPolicy.Construct(
aOptions.mExtensions.mEnforceCredentialProtectionPolicy.Value());
}
if (aOptions.mExtensions.mCredProps.WasPassed()) {
extensionsJSON.mCredProps.Construct(
aOptions.mExtensions.mCredProps.Value());
}
if (aOptions.mExtensions.mHmacCreateSecret.WasPassed()) {
extensionsJSON.mHmacCreateSecret.Construct(
aOptions.mExtensions.mHmacCreateSecret.Value());
}
if (aOptions.mExtensions.mMinPinLength.WasPassed()) {
extensionsJSON.mMinPinLength.Construct(
aOptions.mExtensions.mMinPinLength.Value());
}
if (aOptions.mExtensions.mLargeBlob.WasPassed()) {
const AuthenticationExtensionsLargeBlobInputs& largeBlobInputs =
aOptions.mExtensions.mLargeBlob.Value();
AuthenticationExtensionsLargeBlobInputsJSON& largeBlobInputsJSON =
extensionsJSON.mLargeBlob.Construct();
if (largeBlobInputs.mSupport.WasPassed()) {
largeBlobInputsJSON.mSupport.Construct(largeBlobInputs.mSupport.Value());
}
if (largeBlobInputs.mRead.WasPassed()) {
largeBlobInputsJSON.mRead.Construct(largeBlobInputs.mRead.Value());
}
if (largeBlobInputs.mWrite.WasPassed()) {
nsString write;
rv = SerializeWebAuthnData(largeBlobInputs.mWrite.Value(), write);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
largeBlobInputsJSON.mWrite.Construct(write);
}
}
if (aOptions.mExtensions.mPrf.WasPassed()) {
const AuthenticationExtensionsPRFInputs& prfInputs =
aOptions.mExtensions.mPrf.Value();
AuthenticationExtensionsPRFInputsJSON& prfInputsJSON =
extensionsJSON.mPrf.Construct();
if (prfInputs.mEval.WasPassed()) {
AuthenticationExtensionsPRFValuesJSON& evalJSON =
prfInputsJSON.mEval.Construct();
rv = SerializeWebAuthnData(prfInputs.mEval.Value().mFirst,
evalJSON.mFirst);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (prfInputs.mEval.Value().mSecond.WasPassed()) {
nsString second;
rv = SerializeWebAuthnData(prfInputs.mEval.Value().mSecond.Value(),
second);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
evalJSON.mSecond.Construct(second);
}
}
if (prfInputs.mEvalByCredential.WasPassed()) {
auto& evalByCredentialJSON = prfInputsJSON.mEvalByCredential.Construct();
for (const auto& entry : prfInputs.mEvalByCredential.Value().Entries()) {
auto* jsonEntry =
evalByCredentialJSON.Entries().AppendElement(fallible);
if (!jsonEntry) {
return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
jsonEntry->mKey = entry.mKey;
AuthenticationExtensionsPRFValuesJSON& valuesJSON = jsonEntry->mValue;
rv = SerializeWebAuthnData(entry.mValue.mFirst, valuesJSON.mFirst);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (entry.mValue.mSecond.WasPassed()) {
nsString second;
rv = SerializeWebAuthnData(entry.mValue.mSecond.Value(), second);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
valuesJSON.mSecond.Construct(second);
}
}
}
}
JS::Rooted<JS::Value> value(aCx);
if (!ToJSValue(aCx, json, &value)) {
// Callers reject the promise with a fixed error code and have no way to
// forward a pending exception, so we must not leave one set.
JS_ClearPendingException(aCx);
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
nsAutoString jsonString;
if (!nsContentUtils::StringifyJSON(aCx, value, jsonString,
UndefinedIsNullStringLiteral)) {
JS_ClearPendingException(aCx);
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
aOut = std::move(jsonString);
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult SerializeWebAuthnRequestOptions(
JSContext* aCx, const nsString& aRpId,
const PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions& aOptions, nsString& aOut) {
nsresult rv;
PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptionsJSON json;
rv = SerializeWebAuthnData(aOptions.mChallenge, json.mChallenge);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
json.mTimeout.Construct(WebAuthnTimeout(aOptions.mTimeout));
json.mRpId.Construct(aRpId);
for (const auto& allowCredential : aOptions.mAllowCredentials) {
PublicKeyCredentialDescriptorJSON* allowCredentialJSON =
json.mAllowCredentials.AppendElement(fallible);
if (!allowCredentialJSON) {
return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
allowCredentialJSON->mType = allowCredential.mType;
rv = SerializeWebAuthnData(allowCredential.mId, allowCredentialJSON->mId);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (allowCredential.mTransports.WasPassed()) {
allowCredentialJSON->mTransports.Construct(
allowCredential.mTransports.Value());
}
}
json.mUserVerification = aOptions.mUserVerification;
json.mHints = aOptions.mHints;
AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputsJSON& extensionsJSON =
json.mExtensions.Construct();
if (aOptions.mExtensions.mAppid.WasPassed()) {
extensionsJSON.mAppid.Construct(aOptions.mExtensions.mAppid.Value());
}
if (aOptions.mExtensions.mCredProps.WasPassed()) {
extensionsJSON.mCredProps.Construct(
aOptions.mExtensions.mCredProps.Value());
}
if (aOptions.mExtensions.mHmacCreateSecret.WasPassed()) {
extensionsJSON.mHmacCreateSecret.Construct(
aOptions.mExtensions.mHmacCreateSecret.Value());
}
if (aOptions.mExtensions.mMinPinLength.WasPassed()) {
extensionsJSON.mMinPinLength.Construct(
aOptions.mExtensions.mMinPinLength.Value());
}
if (aOptions.mExtensions.mLargeBlob.WasPassed()) {
const AuthenticationExtensionsLargeBlobInputs& largeBlobInputs =
aOptions.mExtensions.mLargeBlob.Value();
AuthenticationExtensionsLargeBlobInputsJSON& largeBlobInputsJSON =
extensionsJSON.mLargeBlob.Construct();
if (largeBlobInputs.mSupport.WasPassed()) {
largeBlobInputsJSON.mSupport.Construct(largeBlobInputs.mSupport.Value());
}
if (largeBlobInputs.mRead.WasPassed()) {
largeBlobInputsJSON.mRead.Construct(largeBlobInputs.mRead.Value());
}
if (largeBlobInputs.mWrite.WasPassed()) {
nsString write;
rv = SerializeWebAuthnData(largeBlobInputs.mWrite.Value(), write);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
largeBlobInputsJSON.mWrite.Construct(write);
}
}
if (aOptions.mExtensions.mPrf.WasPassed()) {
const AuthenticationExtensionsPRFInputs& prfInputs =
aOptions.mExtensions.mPrf.Value();
AuthenticationExtensionsPRFInputsJSON& prfInputsJSON =
extensionsJSON.mPrf.Construct();
if (prfInputs.mEval.WasPassed()) {
AuthenticationExtensionsPRFValuesJSON& evalJSON =
prfInputsJSON.mEval.Construct();
rv = SerializeWebAuthnData(prfInputs.mEval.Value().mFirst,
evalJSON.mFirst);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (prfInputs.mEval.Value().mSecond.WasPassed()) {
nsString second;
rv = SerializeWebAuthnData(prfInputs.mEval.Value().mSecond.Value(),
second);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
evalJSON.mSecond.Construct(second);
}
}
if (prfInputs.mEvalByCredential.WasPassed()) {
auto& evalByCredentialJSON = prfInputsJSON.mEvalByCredential.Construct();
for (const auto& entry : prfInputs.mEvalByCredential.Value().Entries()) {
auto* jsonEntry =
evalByCredentialJSON.Entries().AppendElement(fallible);
if (!jsonEntry) {
return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
jsonEntry->mKey = entry.mKey;
AuthenticationExtensionsPRFValuesJSON& valuesJSON = jsonEntry->mValue;
rv = SerializeWebAuthnData(entry.mValue.mFirst, valuesJSON.mFirst);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (entry.mValue.mSecond.WasPassed()) {
nsString second;
rv = SerializeWebAuthnData(entry.mValue.mSecond.Value(), second);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
valuesJSON.mSecond.Construct(second);
}
}
}
}
JS::Rooted<JS::Value> value(aCx);
if (!ToJSValue(aCx, json, &value)) {
// Callers reject the promise with a fixed error code and have no way to
// forward a pending exception, so we must not leave one set.
JS_ClearPendingException(aCx);
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
nsAutoString jsonString;
if (!nsContentUtils::StringifyJSON(aCx, value, jsonString,
UndefinedIsNullStringLiteral)) {
JS_ClearPendingException(aCx);
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
aOut = std::move(jsonString);
return NS_OK;
}
} // namespace mozilla::dom
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