This is the case for the vast majority of users due to having win32k lockdown. If that is disabled we don't run anything new in the content process that requires the STA any more. This means we can also remove the SingleNativeEventPump that was introduced to make sure windows internal messages kept getting processed, specifically for using native themes, which has been removed. Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D288631
462 lines
16 KiB
C++
462 lines
16 KiB
C++
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
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* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
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* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
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#include "mozilla/mscom/ProcessRuntime.h"
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#include <accctrl.h>
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#include <aclapi.h>
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#include <objbase.h>
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#include <objidl.h>
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#include "mozilla/Assertions.h"
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#include "mozilla/mscom/COMWrappers.h"
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#include "mozilla/mscom/ProcessRuntimeShared.h"
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#include "mozilla/RefPtr.h"
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#include "mozilla/WindowsProcessMitigations.h"
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#if defined(MOZILLA_INTERNAL_API)
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# include "mozilla/mscom/EnsureMTA.h"
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# if defined(MOZ_SANDBOX)
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# include "mozilla/sandboxTarget.h"
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# endif // defined(MOZ_SANDBOX)
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#endif // defined(MOZILLA_INTERNAL_API)
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// This API from oleaut32.dll is not declared in Windows SDK headers
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extern "C" void __cdecl SetOaNoCache(void);
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using namespace mozilla::mscom::detail;
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namespace mozilla {
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namespace mscom {
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#if defined(MOZILLA_INTERNAL_API)
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ProcessRuntime* ProcessRuntime::sInstance = nullptr;
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ProcessRuntime::ProcessRuntime() : ProcessRuntime(XRE_GetProcessType()) {}
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ProcessRuntime::ProcessRuntime(const GeckoProcessType aProcessType)
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: ProcessRuntime(aProcessType == GeckoProcessType_Default
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? ProcessCategory::GeckoBrowserParent
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: aProcessType == GeckoProcessType_Content
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? ProcessCategory::GeckoContent
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: ProcessCategory::GeckoChild) {}
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#endif // defined(MOZILLA_INTERNAL_API)
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ProcessRuntime::ProcessRuntime(const ProcessCategory aProcessCategory)
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: mInitResult(CO_E_NOTINITIALIZED), mProcessCategory(aProcessCategory) {
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#if defined(MOZILLA_INTERNAL_API)
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MOZ_DIAGNOSTIC_ASSERT(!sInstance);
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sInstance = this;
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EnsureMTA();
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/**
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* From this point forward, all threads in this process are implicitly
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* members of the multi-threaded apartment, with the following exceptions:
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* 1. If any Win32 GUI APIs were called on the current thread prior to
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* executing this constructor, then this thread has already been implicitly
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* initialized as the process's main STA thread; or
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* 2. A thread explicitly and successfully calls CoInitialize(Ex) to specify
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* otherwise.
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*/
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const bool isCurThreadImplicitMTA = IsCurrentThreadImplicitMTA();
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// We only assert that the implicit MTA precondition holds when not running
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// as the Gecko parent process.
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MOZ_DIAGNOSTIC_ASSERT(aProcessCategory ==
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ProcessCategory::GeckoBrowserParent ||
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isCurThreadImplicitMTA);
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const bool needsMTAInit =
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GetDesiredApartmentType(mProcessCategory) == COINIT_MULTITHREADED;
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# if defined(MOZ_SANDBOX)
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// Child processes that want MTA and run under the sandbox need special
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// handling: the sandbox provides a privileged impersonation token during
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// early startup that must be active when COM is initialized, and PostInit
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// must be deferred until privilege drop.
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const bool needsSandboxedMTAInit =
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needsMTAInit && SandboxTarget::Instance()->IsSandboxed();
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# else
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const bool needsSandboxedMTAInit = false;
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# endif
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// If we are initializing COM on the MTA, we ideally want our current thread
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// to be running implicitly inside the MTA, but if for some reason we did
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// not end up with that, we may compensate by completing initialization via
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// EnsureMTA's persistent thread.
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if (!isCurThreadImplicitMTA && needsMTAInit) {
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InitUsingPersistentMTAThread(needsSandboxedMTAInit);
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return;
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}
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#endif // defined(MOZILLA_INTERNAL_API)
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mAptRegion.Init(GetDesiredApartmentType(mProcessCategory));
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// It can happen that we are not the outermost COM initialization on this
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// thread. In fact it should regularly be the case that the outermost
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// initialization occurs from outside of XUL, before we show the skeleton UI,
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// at which point we still need to run some things here from within XUL.
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if (!mAptRegion.IsValidOutermost()) {
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mInitResult = mAptRegion.GetHResult();
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#if defined(MOZILLA_INTERNAL_API)
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MOZ_ASSERT(mProcessCategory == ProcessCategory::GeckoBrowserParent);
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if (mProcessCategory != ProcessCategory::GeckoBrowserParent) {
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// This is unexpected unless we're GeckoBrowserParent
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return;
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}
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ProcessInitLock lock;
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// Is another instance of ProcessRuntime responsible for the outer
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// initialization?
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const bool prevInit =
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lock.GetInitState() == ProcessInitState::FullyInitialized;
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MOZ_ASSERT(prevInit);
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if (prevInit) {
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PostInit();
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}
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#endif // defined(MOZILLA_INTERNAL_API)
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return;
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}
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InitInsideApartment();
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if (FAILED(mInitResult)) {
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return;
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}
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#if defined(MOZILLA_INTERNAL_API)
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# if defined(MOZ_SANDBOX)
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if (needsSandboxedMTAInit) {
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// In sandboxed MTA child processes, defer PostInit until priv drop
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SandboxTarget::Instance()->RegisterSandboxStartCallback([self = this]() {
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// Ensure that we're still live and the init was successful before
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// calling PostInit()
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if (self == sInstance && SUCCEEDED(self->mInitResult)) {
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PostInit();
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}
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});
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return;
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}
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# endif // defined(MOZ_SANDBOX)
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PostInit();
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#endif // defined(MOZILLA_INTERNAL_API)
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}
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#if defined(MOZILLA_INTERNAL_API)
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ProcessRuntime::~ProcessRuntime() {
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MOZ_DIAGNOSTIC_ASSERT(sInstance == this);
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sInstance = nullptr;
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}
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void ProcessRuntime::InitUsingPersistentMTAThread(bool aNeedsSandboxedInit) {
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if (!aNeedsSandboxedInit) {
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EnsureMTA([this]() { InitInsideApartment(); },
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EnsureMTA::Option::ForceDispatchToPersistentThread);
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if (SUCCEEDED(mInitResult)) {
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PostInit();
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}
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return;
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}
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# if defined(MOZ_SANDBOX)
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HANDLE rawCurThreadImpToken;
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if (!::OpenThreadToken(::GetCurrentThread(), TOKEN_DUPLICATE | TOKEN_QUERY,
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FALSE, &rawCurThreadImpToken)) {
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mInitResult = HRESULT_FROM_WIN32(::GetLastError());
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return;
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}
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nsAutoHandle curThreadImpToken(rawCurThreadImpToken);
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// Ensure that our current token is still an impersonation token (ie, we
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// have not yet called RevertToSelf() on this thread).
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DWORD len;
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TOKEN_TYPE tokenType;
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MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(
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::GetTokenInformation(rawCurThreadImpToken, TokenType, &tokenType,
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sizeof(tokenType), &len) &&
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len == sizeof(tokenType) && tokenType == TokenImpersonation);
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// Create an impersonation token based on the current thread's token
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HANDLE rawMtaThreadImpToken = nullptr;
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if (!::DuplicateToken(rawCurThreadImpToken, SecurityImpersonation,
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&rawMtaThreadImpToken)) {
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mInitResult = HRESULT_FROM_WIN32(::GetLastError());
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return;
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}
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nsAutoHandle mtaThreadImpToken(rawMtaThreadImpToken);
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// Impersonate and initialize.
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bool tokenSet = false;
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EnsureMTA(
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[this, rawMtaThreadImpToken, &tokenSet]() -> void {
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if (!::SetThreadToken(nullptr, rawMtaThreadImpToken)) {
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mInitResult = HRESULT_FROM_WIN32(::GetLastError());
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return;
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}
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tokenSet = true;
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InitInsideApartment();
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},
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EnsureMTA::Option::ForceDispatchToPersistentThread);
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if (!tokenSet) {
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return;
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}
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SandboxTarget::Instance()->RegisterSandboxStartCallback(
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[self = this]() -> void {
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EnsureMTA(
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[]() -> void {
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// This is a security risk if it fails, so we release assert
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MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(::RevertToSelf(),
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"mscom::ProcessRuntime RevertToSelf failed");
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},
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EnsureMTA::Option::ForceDispatchToPersistentThread);
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// Ensure that we're still live and the init was successful before
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// calling PostInit()
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if (self == sInstance && SUCCEEDED(self->mInitResult)) {
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PostInit();
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}
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});
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# endif // defined(MOZ_SANDBOX)
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}
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#endif // defined(MOZILLA_INTERNAL_API)
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/* static */
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COINIT ProcessRuntime::GetDesiredApartmentType(
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const ProcessRuntime::ProcessCategory aProcessCategory) {
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switch (aProcessCategory) {
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case ProcessCategory::GeckoBrowserParent:
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return COINIT_APARTMENTTHREADED;
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case ProcessCategory::GeckoContent:
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return COINIT_MULTITHREADED;
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case ProcessCategory::GeckoChild:
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if (!IsWin32kLockedDown()) {
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// If Win32k is not locked down then we probably still need STA.
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// We disable DDE since that is not usable from child processes.
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return static_cast<COINIT>(COINIT_APARTMENTTHREADED |
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COINIT_DISABLE_OLE1DDE);
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}
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[[fallthrough]];
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default:
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return COINIT_MULTITHREADED;
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}
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}
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void ProcessRuntime::InitInsideApartment() {
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ProcessInitLock lock;
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const ProcessInitState prevInitState = lock.GetInitState();
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if (prevInitState == ProcessInitState::FullyInitialized) {
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// COM has already been initialized by a previous ProcessRuntime instance
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mInitResult = S_OK;
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return;
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}
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if (prevInitState < ProcessInitState::PartialSecurityInitialized) {
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// We are required to initialize security prior to configuring global
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// options.
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mInitResult = InitializeSecurity(mProcessCategory);
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// Downgrading from a MOZ_DIAGNOSTIC_ASSERT while investigating
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// bug 1930846.
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MOZ_ASSERT(SUCCEEDED(mInitResult));
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// Even though this isn't great, we should try to proceed even when
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// CoInitializeSecurity has previously been called: the additional settings
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// we want to change are important enough that we don't want to skip them.
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if (FAILED(mInitResult) && mInitResult != RPC_E_TOO_LATE) {
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return;
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}
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lock.SetInitState(ProcessInitState::PartialSecurityInitialized);
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}
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if (prevInitState < ProcessInitState::PartialGlobalOptions) {
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RefPtr<IGlobalOptions> globalOpts;
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mInitResult = wrapped::CoCreateInstance(
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CLSID_GlobalOptions, nullptr, CLSCTX_INPROC_SERVER, IID_IGlobalOptions,
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getter_AddRefs(globalOpts));
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MOZ_ASSERT(SUCCEEDED(mInitResult));
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if (FAILED(mInitResult)) {
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return;
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}
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// Disable COM's catch-all exception handler
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mInitResult = globalOpts->Set(COMGLB_EXCEPTION_HANDLING,
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COMGLB_EXCEPTION_DONOT_HANDLE_ANY);
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MOZ_ASSERT(SUCCEEDED(mInitResult));
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if (FAILED(mInitResult)) {
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return;
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}
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lock.SetInitState(ProcessInitState::PartialGlobalOptions);
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}
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// Disable the BSTR cache (as it never invalidates, thus leaking memory)
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// (This function is itself idempotent, so we do not concern ourselves with
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// tracking whether or not we've already called it.)
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::SetOaNoCache();
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lock.SetInitState(ProcessInitState::FullyInitialized);
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}
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#if defined(MOZILLA_INTERNAL_API)
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/**
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* Guaranteed to run *after* the COM (and possible sandboxing) initialization
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* has successfully completed and stabilized. This method MUST BE IDEMPOTENT!
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*/
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/* static */ void ProcessRuntime::PostInit() {
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// Currently "roughed-in" but unused.
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}
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#endif // defined(MOZILLA_INTERNAL_API)
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/* static */
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DWORD
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ProcessRuntime::GetClientThreadId() {
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DWORD callerTid;
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HRESULT hr = ::CoGetCallerTID(&callerTid);
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// Don't return callerTid unless the call succeeded and returned S_FALSE,
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// indicating that the caller originates from a different process.
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if (hr != S_FALSE) {
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return 0;
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}
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return callerTid;
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}
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MOZ_COLD static HRESULT DiagnosticAssertOrHResultFromLastError() {
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HRESULT hr = HRESULT_FROM_WIN32(::GetLastError());
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MOZ_DIAGNOSTIC_ASSERT(SUCCEEDED(hr));
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return hr;
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}
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/* static */
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HRESULT
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ProcessRuntime::InitializeSecurity(const ProcessCategory aProcessCategory) {
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// Reserve enough room on the stack for the ACL to hold the maximum number of
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// ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACEs we might add. The calculation is explained in the
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// Remarks section of the documentation for InitializeAcl.
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const size_t kMaxAceCount = 5;
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constexpr auto requiredACLSize =
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sizeof(ACL) + (kMaxAceCount * (sizeof(ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE) -
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sizeof(ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE::SidStart) +
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SECURITY_MAX_SID_SIZE));
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static_assert((requiredACLSize % sizeof(DWORD)) == 0,
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"ACL length must be DWORD aligned.");
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alignas(DWORD) BYTE aclBytes[requiredACLSize];
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auto* pAcl = reinterpret_cast<ACL*>(aclBytes);
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if (!::InitializeAcl(pAcl, requiredACLSize, ACL_REVISION)) {
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return DiagnosticAssertOrHResultFromLastError();
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}
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HANDLE rawProcessToken;
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if (!::OpenProcessToken(::GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_QUERY,
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&rawProcessToken)) {
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return DiagnosticAssertOrHResultFromLastError();
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}
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nsAutoHandle processToken(rawProcessToken);
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// Grant access to the user's SID.
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DWORD len = 0;
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SE_TOKEN_USER tokenUser;
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if (!::GetTokenInformation(processToken, TokenUser, &tokenUser,
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sizeof(tokenUser), &len)) {
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return DiagnosticAssertOrHResultFromLastError();
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}
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if (!::AddAccessAllowedAce(pAcl, ACL_REVISION, COM_RIGHTS_EXECUTE,
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&tokenUser.Sid)) {
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return DiagnosticAssertOrHResultFromLastError();
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}
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// Grant access to the SYSTEM SID.
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SE_SID wellKnownSid;
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DWORD wellKnownSidSize = sizeof(wellKnownSid);
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if (!::CreateWellKnownSid(WinLocalSystemSid, nullptr, &wellKnownSid,
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&wellKnownSidSize)) {
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return DiagnosticAssertOrHResultFromLastError();
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}
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if (!::AddAccessAllowedAce(pAcl, ACL_REVISION, COM_RIGHTS_EXECUTE,
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&wellKnownSid)) {
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return DiagnosticAssertOrHResultFromLastError();
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}
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// Grant access to the Administrator SID.
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wellKnownSidSize = sizeof(wellKnownSid);
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if (!::CreateWellKnownSid(WinBuiltinAdministratorsSid, nullptr, &wellKnownSid,
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&wellKnownSidSize)) {
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return DiagnosticAssertOrHResultFromLastError();
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}
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if (!::AddAccessAllowedAce(pAcl, ACL_REVISION, COM_RIGHTS_EXECUTE,
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&wellKnownSid)) {
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return DiagnosticAssertOrHResultFromLastError();
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}
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// If we are the browser process, grant access to all non restricted app
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// containers.
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if (aProcessCategory == ProcessCategory::GeckoBrowserParent) {
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wellKnownSidSize = sizeof(wellKnownSid);
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if (!::CreateWellKnownSid(WinBuiltinAnyPackageSid, nullptr, &wellKnownSid,
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&wellKnownSidSize)) {
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return DiagnosticAssertOrHResultFromLastError();
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}
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if (!::AddAccessAllowedAce(pAcl, ACL_REVISION, COM_RIGHTS_EXECUTE,
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&wellKnownSid)) {
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return DiagnosticAssertOrHResultFromLastError();
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}
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}
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// If in an app container grant access to it. Don't fail if we get an error
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// retrieving the app container SID.
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alignas(TOKEN_APPCONTAINER_INFORMATION)
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BYTE appContainerInfoBuf[TOKEN_APPCONTAINER_SID_MAX_SIZE];
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auto* appContainerInfo =
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reinterpret_cast<TOKEN_APPCONTAINER_INFORMATION*>(appContainerInfoBuf);
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bool haveAppContainerSid =
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::GetTokenInformation(processToken, TokenAppContainerSid,
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appContainerInfo, sizeof(appContainerInfoBuf),
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&len) &&
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appContainerInfo->TokenAppContainer;
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if (haveAppContainerSid) {
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if (!::AddAccessAllowedAce(pAcl, ACL_REVISION, COM_RIGHTS_EXECUTE,
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appContainerInfo->TokenAppContainer)) {
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return DiagnosticAssertOrHResultFromLastError();
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}
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}
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alignas(TOKEN_PRIMARY_GROUP)
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BYTE primaryGroupBuf[sizeof(TOKEN_PRIMARY_GROUP) + SECURITY_MAX_SID_SIZE];
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auto* primaryGroup = reinterpret_cast<TOKEN_PRIMARY_GROUP*>(primaryGroupBuf);
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if (!::GetTokenInformation(processToken, TokenPrimaryGroup, primaryGroup,
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sizeof(primaryGroupBuf), &len)) {
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return DiagnosticAssertOrHResultFromLastError();
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}
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SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR sd;
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if (!::InitializeSecurityDescriptor(&sd, SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_REVISION)) {
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return DiagnosticAssertOrHResultFromLastError();
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}
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if (!::SetSecurityDescriptorDacl(&sd, TRUE, pAcl, FALSE)) {
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return DiagnosticAssertOrHResultFromLastError();
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}
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if (!::SetSecurityDescriptorOwner(&sd, tokenUser.User.Sid, FALSE)) {
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return DiagnosticAssertOrHResultFromLastError();
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}
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if (!::SetSecurityDescriptorGroup(&sd, primaryGroup->PrimaryGroup, FALSE)) {
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return DiagnosticAssertOrHResultFromLastError();
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}
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HRESULT hr = wrapped::CoInitializeSecurity(
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&sd, -1, nullptr, nullptr, RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_DEFAULT,
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RPC_C_IMP_LEVEL_IDENTIFY, nullptr, EOAC_NONE, nullptr);
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MOZ_DIAGNOSTIC_ASSERT(SUCCEEDED(hr));
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return hr;
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}
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} // namespace mscom
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} // namespace mozilla
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