/*
 * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
 * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
 * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */

#include "nsNSSCallbacks.h"

#include "EnabledSignatureSchemes.h"
#include "NSSSocketControl.h"
#include "PKCS11ModuleDB.h"
#include "SSLTokensCache.h"
#include "ScopedNSSTypes.h"
#include "SharedCertVerifier.h"
#include "mozilla/Assertions.h"
#include "mozilla/Casting.h"
#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
#include "mozilla/RefPtr.h"
#include "mozilla/ScopeExit.h"
#include "mozilla/Services.h"
#include "mozilla/Span.h"
#include "mozilla/SpinEventLoopUntil.h"
#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_security.h"
#include "mozilla/SyncRunnable.h"
#include "mozilla/glean/SecurityManagerSslMetrics.h"
#include "mozpkix/pkixtypes.h"
#include "nsComponentManagerUtils.h"
#include "nsContentUtils.h"
#include "nsIChannel.h"
#include "nsIHttpChannel.h"
#include "nsIHttpChannelInternal.h"
#include "nsIObserverService.h"
#include "nsIPrompt.h"
#include "nsIProtocolProxyService.h"
#include "nsIStreamLoader.h"
#include "nsISupportsPriority.h"
#include "nsIUploadChannel.h"
#include "nsIWebProgressListener.h"
#include "nsNSSCertHelper.h"
#include "nsNSSCertificate.h"
#include "nsNSSComponent.h"
#include "nsNSSIOLayer.h"
#include "nsNetUtil.h"
#include "nsProxyRelease.h"
#include "nsStringStream.h"
#include "ssl.h"
#include "sslproto.h"

using namespace mozilla;
using namespace mozilla::pkix;
using namespace mozilla::psm;

extern LazyLogModule gPIPNSSLog;

namespace {

// Bits in bit mask for SSL_REASONS_FOR_NOT_FALSE_STARTING telemetry probe
// These bits are numbered so that the least subtle issues have higher values.
// This should make it easier for us to interpret the results.
const uint32_t POSSIBLE_VERSION_DOWNGRADE = 4;
const uint32_t POSSIBLE_CIPHER_SUITE_DOWNGRADE = 2;
const uint32_t KEA_NOT_SUPPORTED = 1;

}  // namespace

class OCSPRequest final : public nsIStreamLoaderObserver, public nsIRunnable {
 public:
  OCSPRequest(const nsACString& aiaLocation,
              const OriginAttributes& originAttributes,
              const uint8_t (&ocspRequest)[OCSP_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH],
              size_t ocspRequestLength, TimeDuration timeout);

  NS_DECL_THREADSAFE_ISUPPORTS
  NS_DECL_NSISTREAMLOADEROBSERVER
  NS_DECL_NSIRUNNABLE

  nsresult DispatchToMainThreadAndWait();
  nsresult GetResponse(/*out*/ Vector<uint8_t>& response);

 private:
  ~OCSPRequest() = default;

  static void OnTimeout(nsITimer* timer, void* closure);
  nsresult NotifyDone(nsresult rv, MonitorAutoLock& proofOfLock);

  // mMonitor provides the memory barrier protecting these member variables.
  // What happens is the originating thread creates an OCSPRequest object with
  // the information necessary to perform an OCSP request. It sends the object
  // to the main thread and waits on the monitor for the operation to complete.
  // On the main thread, a channel is set up to perform the request. This gets
  // dispatched to necko. At the same time, a timeout timer is initialized. If
  // the necko request completes, the response data is filled out, mNotifiedDone
  // is set to true, and the monitor is notified. The original thread then wakes
  // up and continues with the results that have been filled out. If the request
  // times out, again the response data is filled out, mNotifiedDone is set to
  // true, and the monitor is notified. The first of these two events wins. That
  // is, if the timeout timer fires but the request completes shortly after, the
  // caller will see the request as having timed out.
  // When the request completes (i.e. OnStreamComplete runs), the timer will be
  // cancelled. This is how we know the closure in OnTimeout is valid. If the
  // timer fires before OnStreamComplete runs, it should be safe to not cancel
  // the request because necko has a strong reference to it.
  Monitor mMonitor MOZ_UNANNOTATED;
  bool mNotifiedDone;
  nsCOMPtr<nsIStreamLoader> mLoader;
  const nsCString mAIALocation;
  const OriginAttributes mOriginAttributes;
  const mozilla::Span<const char> mPOSTData;
  const TimeDuration mTimeout;
  nsCOMPtr<nsITimer> mTimeoutTimer;
  TimeStamp mStartTime;
  nsresult mResponseResult;
  Vector<uint8_t> mResponseBytes;
};

NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(OCSPRequest, nsIStreamLoaderObserver, nsIRunnable)

OCSPRequest::OCSPRequest(const nsACString& aiaLocation,
                         const OriginAttributes& originAttributes,
                         const uint8_t (&ocspRequest)[OCSP_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH],
                         size_t ocspRequestLength, TimeDuration timeout)
    : mMonitor("OCSPRequest.mMonitor"),
      mNotifiedDone(false),
      mLoader(nullptr),
      mAIALocation(aiaLocation),
      mOriginAttributes(originAttributes),
      mPOSTData(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(ocspRequest), ocspRequestLength),
      mTimeout(timeout),
      mTimeoutTimer(nullptr),
      mResponseResult(NS_ERROR_FAILURE) {
  MOZ_ASSERT(ocspRequestLength <= OCSP_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH);
}

nsresult OCSPRequest::DispatchToMainThreadAndWait() {
  MOZ_ASSERT(!NS_IsMainThread());
  if (NS_IsMainThread()) {
    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
  }

  MonitorAutoLock lock(mMonitor);
  nsresult rv = NS_DispatchToMainThread(this);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return rv;
  }
  while (!mNotifiedDone) {
    lock.Wait();
  }

  // CERT_VALIDATION_HTTP_REQUEST_RESULT:
  // 0: request timed out
  // 1: request succeeded
  // 2: request failed
  // 3: internal error
  // If mStartTime was never set, we consider this an internal error.
  // Otherwise, we managed to at least send the request.
  if (mStartTime.IsNull()) {
    glean::cert::validation_http_request_result.AccumulateSingleSample(3);
  } else if (mResponseResult == NS_ERROR_NET_TIMEOUT) {
    glean::cert::validation_http_request_result.AccumulateSingleSample(0);
    mozilla::glean::ocsp_request_time::cancel.AccumulateRawDuration(
        TimeStamp::Now() - mStartTime);
  } else if (NS_SUCCEEDED(mResponseResult)) {
    glean::cert::validation_http_request_result.AccumulateSingleSample(1);
    mozilla::glean::ocsp_request_time::success.AccumulateRawDuration(
        TimeStamp::Now() - mStartTime);
  } else {
    glean::cert::validation_http_request_result.AccumulateSingleSample(2);
    mozilla::glean::ocsp_request_time::failure.AccumulateRawDuration(
        TimeStamp::Now() - mStartTime);
  }
  return rv;
}

nsresult OCSPRequest::GetResponse(/*out*/ Vector<uint8_t>& response) {
  MOZ_ASSERT(!NS_IsMainThread());
  if (NS_IsMainThread()) {
    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
  }

  MonitorAutoLock lock(mMonitor);
  if (!mNotifiedDone) {
    return NS_ERROR_IN_PROGRESS;
  }
  if (NS_FAILED(mResponseResult)) {
    return mResponseResult;
  }
  response.clear();
  if (!response.append(mResponseBytes.begin(), mResponseBytes.length())) {
    return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
  }
  return NS_OK;
}

static constexpr auto OCSP_REQUEST_MIME_TYPE = "application/ocsp-request"_ns;
static constexpr auto OCSP_REQUEST_METHOD = "POST"_ns;

NS_IMETHODIMP
OCSPRequest::Run() {
  MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
  if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
  }

  MonitorAutoLock lock(mMonitor);

  nsCOMPtr<nsIIOService> ios = do_GetIOService();
  if (!ios) {
    return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_FAILURE, lock);
  }

  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
  nsresult rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(uri), mAIALocation);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI, lock);
  }
  nsAutoCString scheme;
  rv = uri->GetScheme(scheme);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
  }
  if (!scheme.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("http")) {
    return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI, lock);
  }

  // See bug 1219935.
  // We should not send OCSP request if the PAC is still loading.
  nsCOMPtr<nsIProtocolProxyService> pps =
      do_GetService(NS_PROTOCOLPROXYSERVICE_CONTRACTID, &rv);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
  }

  if (pps->GetIsPACLoading()) {
    return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_FAILURE, lock);
  }

  nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> channel;
  rv = ios->NewChannel(mAIALocation, nullptr, nullptr,
                       nullptr,  // aLoadingNode
                       nsContentUtils::GetSystemPrincipal(),
                       nullptr,  // aTriggeringPrincipal
                       nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_SEC_CONTEXT_IS_NULL,
                       nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER, getter_AddRefs(channel));
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
  }

  // Security operations scheduled through normal HTTP channels are given
  // high priority to accommodate real time OCSP transactions.
  nsCOMPtr<nsISupportsPriority> priorityChannel = do_QueryInterface(channel);
  if (priorityChannel) {
    priorityChannel->AdjustPriority(nsISupportsPriority::PRIORITY_HIGHEST);
  }

  channel->SetLoadFlags(
      nsIRequest::LOAD_ANONYMOUS | nsIRequest::LOAD_BYPASS_CACHE |
      nsIRequest::INHIBIT_CACHING | nsIChannel::LOAD_BYPASS_SERVICE_WORKER |
      nsIChannel::LOAD_BYPASS_URL_CLASSIFIER);

  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = channel->LoadInfo();

  // Prevent HTTPS-Only Mode from upgrading the OCSP request.
  uint32_t httpsOnlyStatus = loadInfo->GetHttpsOnlyStatus();
  httpsOnlyStatus |= nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_EXEMPT;
  loadInfo->SetHttpsOnlyStatus(httpsOnlyStatus);

  // allow deprecated HTTP request from SystemPrincipal
  loadInfo->SetAllowDeprecatedSystemRequests(true);

  // For OCSP requests, only the first party domain and private browsing id
  // aspects of origin attributes are used. This means that:
  // a) if first party isolation is enabled, OCSP requests will be isolated
  // according to the first party domain of the original https request
  // b) OCSP requests are shared across different containers as long as first
  // party isolation is not enabled and none of the containers are in private
  // browsing mode.
  if (mOriginAttributes != OriginAttributes()) {
    OriginAttributes attrs;
    attrs.mFirstPartyDomain = mOriginAttributes.mFirstPartyDomain;
    attrs.mPrivateBrowsingId = mOriginAttributes.mPrivateBrowsingId;

    rv = loadInfo->SetOriginAttributes(attrs);
    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
      return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
    }
  }

  nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> uploadStream;
  rv = NS_NewByteInputStream(getter_AddRefs(uploadStream), mPOSTData,
                             NS_ASSIGNMENT_COPY);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
  }
  nsCOMPtr<nsIUploadChannel> uploadChannel(do_QueryInterface(channel));
  if (!uploadChannel) {
    return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_FAILURE, lock);
  }
  rv = uploadChannel->SetUploadStream(uploadStream, OCSP_REQUEST_MIME_TYPE, -1);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
  }
  // Do not use SPDY or HTTP3 for internal security operations. It could result
  // in the silent upgrade to ssl, which in turn could require an SSL
  // operation to fulfill something like an OCSP fetch, which is an
  // endless loop.
  nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannelInternal> internalChannel = do_QueryInterface(channel);
  if (!internalChannel) {
    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
  }
  rv = internalChannel->SetAllowSpdy(false);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
  }
  rv = internalChannel->SetAllowHttp3(false);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
  }
  rv = internalChannel->SetIsOCSP(true);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
  }
  nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> hchan = do_QueryInterface(channel);
  if (!hchan) {
    return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_FAILURE, lock);
  }
  rv = hchan->SetAllowSTS(false);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
  }
  rv = hchan->SetRequestMethod(OCSP_REQUEST_METHOD);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
  }

  rv = NS_NewStreamLoader(getter_AddRefs(mLoader), this);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
  }

  rv = NS_NewTimerWithFuncCallback(
      getter_AddRefs(mTimeoutTimer), OCSPRequest::OnTimeout, this,
      mTimeout.ToMilliseconds(), nsITimer::TYPE_ONE_SHOT,
      "OCSPRequest::Run"_ns);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
  }
  rv = hchan->AsyncOpen(this->mLoader);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
  }
  mStartTime = TimeStamp::Now();
  return NS_OK;
}

nsresult OCSPRequest::NotifyDone(nsresult rv, MonitorAutoLock& lock) {
  MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
  if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
  }

  if (mNotifiedDone) {
    return mResponseResult;
  }
  mLoader = nullptr;
  mResponseResult = rv;
  if (mTimeoutTimer) {
    (void)mTimeoutTimer->Cancel();
  }
  mNotifiedDone = true;
  lock.Notify();
  return rv;
}

NS_IMETHODIMP
OCSPRequest::OnStreamComplete(nsIStreamLoader* aLoader, nsISupports* aContext,
                              nsresult aStatus, uint32_t responseLen,
                              const uint8_t* responseBytes) {
  MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
  if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
  }

  MonitorAutoLock lock(mMonitor);

  nsCOMPtr<nsIRequest> req;
  nsresult rv = aLoader->GetRequest(getter_AddRefs(req));
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
  }

  if (NS_FAILED(aStatus)) {
    return NotifyDone(aStatus, lock);
  }

  nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> hchan = do_QueryInterface(req);
  if (!hchan) {
    return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_FAILURE, lock);
  }

  bool requestSucceeded;
  rv = hchan->GetRequestSucceeded(&requestSucceeded);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
  }
  if (!requestSucceeded) {
    return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_FAILURE, lock);
  }

  unsigned int rcode;
  rv = hchan->GetResponseStatus(&rcode);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
  }
  if (rcode != 200) {
    return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_FAILURE, lock);
  }

  mResponseBytes.clear();
  if (!mResponseBytes.append(responseBytes, responseLen)) {
    return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, lock);
  }
  mResponseResult = aStatus;

  return NotifyDone(NS_OK, lock);
}

void OCSPRequest::OnTimeout(nsITimer* timer, void* closure) {
  MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
  if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
    return;
  }

  // We know the OCSPRequest is still alive because if the request had completed
  // (i.e. OnStreamComplete ran), the timer would have been cancelled in
  // NotifyDone.
  OCSPRequest* self = static_cast<OCSPRequest*>(closure);
  MonitorAutoLock lock(self->mMonitor);
  self->mTimeoutTimer = nullptr;
  self->NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_NET_TIMEOUT, lock);
}

mozilla::pkix::Result DoOCSPRequest(
    const nsCString& aiaLocation, const OriginAttributes& originAttributes,
    uint8_t (&ocspRequest)[OCSP_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH], size_t ocspRequestLength,
    TimeDuration timeout, /*out*/ Vector<uint8_t>& result) {
  MOZ_ASSERT(!NS_IsMainThread());
  if (NS_IsMainThread()) {
    return mozilla::pkix::Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT;
  }

  if (ocspRequestLength > OCSP_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH) {
    return mozilla::pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
  }

  result.clear();
  MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
          ("DoOCSPRequest to '%s'", aiaLocation.get()));

  nsCOMPtr<nsIEventTarget> sts =
      do_GetService(NS_SOCKETTRANSPORTSERVICE_CONTRACTID);
  MOZ_ASSERT(sts);
  if (!sts) {
    return mozilla::pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_STATE;
  }
  bool onSTSThread;
  nsresult rv = sts->IsOnCurrentThread(&onSTSThread);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return mozilla::pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
  }
  MOZ_ASSERT(!onSTSThread);
  if (onSTSThread) {
    return mozilla::pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_STATE;
  }

  RefPtr<OCSPRequest> request(new OCSPRequest(
      aiaLocation, originAttributes, ocspRequest, ocspRequestLength, timeout));
  rv = request->DispatchToMainThreadAndWait();
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return mozilla::pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
  }
  rv = request->GetResponse(result);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    if (rv == NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI) {
      return mozilla::pkix::Result::ERROR_CERT_BAD_ACCESS_LOCATION;
    }
    return mozilla::pkix::Result::ERROR_OCSP_SERVER_ERROR;
  }
  return Success;
}

namespace {

static Atomic<uint64_t> sProtectedAuthPromptCounter{0};

// Heap-allocated state shared between ShowProtectedAuthPrompt, the
// background C_Login task, and the cancel observer. Refcounted so the
// background task can outlive the function (it does so when the user
// clicks Cancel — we return SECFailure immediately and let C_Login finish
// in the background, discarding its result). The slot is referenced here
// so it stays alive for the duration of the background C_Login call.
class ProtectedAuthState final {
 public:
  explicit ProtectedAuthState(PK11SlotInfo* slot)
      : mSlot(PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot)) {}
  UniquePK11SlotInfo mSlot;
  Atomic<bool> done{false};
  Atomic<bool> cancelled{false};
  Atomic<SECStatus> result{SECFailure};

  NS_INLINE_DECL_THREADSAFE_REFCOUNTING(ProtectedAuthState)

 private:
  ~ProtectedAuthState() = default;
};

class ProtectedAuthCancelObserver final : public nsIObserver {
 public:
  NS_DECL_THREADSAFE_ISUPPORTS
  NS_DECL_NSIOBSERVER

  ProtectedAuthCancelObserver(RefPtr<ProtectedAuthState> aState,
                              const nsAString& aPromptId)
      : mState(std::move(aState)), mPromptId(aPromptId) {}

 private:
  ~ProtectedAuthCancelObserver() = default;
  RefPtr<ProtectedAuthState> mState;
  nsString mPromptId;
};

NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(ProtectedAuthCancelObserver, nsIObserver)

NS_IMETHODIMP
ProtectedAuthCancelObserver::Observe(nsISupports*, const char*,
                                     const char16_t* aData) {
  // Only react to the cancel notification carrying our unique id; another
  // protected-auth dialog open at the same time uses a different id.
  if (aData && mPromptId.Equals(nsDependentString(aData))) {
    mState->cancelled = true;
  }
  return NS_OK;
}

}  // namespace

static char* ShowProtectedAuthPrompt(PK11SlotInfo* slot) {
  MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
  MOZ_ASSERT(slot);
  if (!NS_IsMainThread() || !slot) {
    return nullptr;
  }

  RefPtr<ProtectedAuthState> state = MakeRefPtr<ProtectedAuthState>(slot);

  // Unique id for this prompt, used to scope the observer notifications so a
  // concurrent protected-auth dialog won't react to ours, or vice versa.
  nsString promptId;
  promptId.AppendInt(++sProtectedAuthPromptCounter);

  // Dispatch a background task to call C_Login. The call will block until
  // the protected authentication (e.g. card reader PIN entry) succeeds or
  // fails. The task takes its own ref to `state` (and through it, the slot)
  // so it can safely outlive this function in the cancel path.
  nsresult rv = NS_DispatchBackgroundTask(
      NS_NewRunnableFunction(
          __func__,
          [state, promptId]() {
            state->result = PK11_CheckUserPassword(state->mSlot.get(), nullptr);
            state->done = true;
            // Best-effort signal to close our dialog if it's still up. The
            // id ensures unrelated dialogs ignore this notification.
            NS_DispatchToMainThread(NS_NewRunnableFunction(
                "pk11-protected-auth-done", [promptId]() {
                  nsCOMPtr<nsIObserverService> obs =
                      mozilla::services::GetObserverService();
                  if (obs) {
                    obs->NotifyObservers(nullptr,
                                         "pk11-protected-auth-complete",
                                         promptId.get());
                  }
                }));
          }),
      NS_DISPATCH_EVENT_MAY_BLOCK);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return nullptr;
  }

  // Wire the dialog's Cancel button: it fires "pk11-protected-auth-cancel"
  // with our promptId as data; the observer flips state->cancelled only when
  // the id matches, so SpinEventLoopUntil exits.
  nsCOMPtr<nsIObserverService> obsService =
      mozilla::services::GetObserverService();
  if (!obsService) {
    return nullptr;
  }
  RefPtr<ProtectedAuthCancelObserver> cancelObserver =
      MakeRefPtr<ProtectedAuthCancelObserver>(state, promptId);
  rv = obsService->AddObserver(cancelObserver, "pk11-protected-auth-cancel",
                               false);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return nullptr;
  }
  auto removeObserver = MakeScopeExit([&]() {
    obsService->RemoveObserver(cancelObserver, "pk11-protected-auth-cancel");
  });

  nsAutoCString tokenName(PK11_GetTokenName(slot));
  ShowProtectedAuthDialog(tokenName, promptId);

  // Wait until C_Login returns, the user cancels, or shutdown.
  MOZ_ALWAYS_TRUE(SpinEventLoopUntil("ShowProtectedAuthPrompt"_ns, [&state]() {
    return static_cast<bool>(state->done) ||
           static_cast<bool>(state->cancelled);
  }));

  // User-initiated cancel: return immediately as auth failure. The
  // background C_Login keeps running until the token responds; its eventual
  // result is dropped when the last RefPtr<ProtectedAuthState> is released.
  if (state->cancelled && !state->done) {
    return nullptr;
  }

  switch (state->result) {
    case SECSuccess:
      return ToNewCString(nsDependentCString(PK11_PW_AUTHENTICATED));
    case SECWouldBlock:
      return ToNewCString(nsDependentCString(PK11_PW_RETRY));
    default:
      return nullptr;
  }
}

class PK11PasswordPromptRunnable final : public nsIRunnable {
 public:
  PK11PasswordPromptRunnable(PK11SlotInfo* slot, nsIInterfaceRequestor* ir)
      : mResult(nullptr), mSlot(slot), mIR(ir) {}

  NS_DECL_THREADSAFE_ISUPPORTS
  NS_DECL_NSIRUNNABLE

  char* mResult;  // out

 private:
  ~PK11PasswordPromptRunnable() = default;

  // Accessed only on the main thread. True if any instance of
  // PK11PasswordPromptRunnable is already running.
  static bool mRunning;

  PK11SlotInfo* mSlot;
  nsIInterfaceRequestor* mIR;
};

NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(PK11PasswordPromptRunnable, nsIRunnable)

bool PK11PasswordPromptRunnable::mRunning = false;

NS_IMETHODIMP
PK11PasswordPromptRunnable::Run() {
  MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
  if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
    return NS_ERROR_NOT_SAME_THREAD;
  }

  // If we've reentered due to the nested event loop implicit in using
  // nsIPrompt synchronously (or indeed the explicit nested event loop in the
  // protected authentication case), bail early, cancelling the password
  // prompt. This will probably cause the operation that resulted in the prompt
  // to fail, but this is better than littering the screen with a bunch of
  // password prompts that the user will probably just cancel anyway.
  if (mRunning) {
    return NS_OK;
  }
  mRunning = true;
  auto setRunningToFalseOnExit = MakeScopeExit([&]() { mRunning = false; });

  // Protected-auth tokens don't need an nsIPrompt — the dialog is opened
  // directly via nsNSSDialogHelper.
  if (PK11_ProtectedAuthenticationPath(mSlot)) {
    mResult = ShowProtectedAuthPrompt(mSlot);
    return NS_OK;
  }

  nsresult rv;
  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrompt> prompt;
  if (!mIR) {
    rv = nsNSSComponent::GetNewPrompter(getter_AddRefs(prompt));
    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
      return rv;
    }
  } else {
    prompt = do_GetInterface(mIR);
    MOZ_ASSERT(prompt, "Interface requestor should implement nsIPrompt");
  }

  if (!prompt) {
    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
  }

  nsAutoString promptString;
  if (PK11_IsInternal(mSlot)) {
    rv = GetPIPNSSBundleString("CertPasswordPromptDefault", promptString);
  } else {
    AutoTArray<nsString, 1> formatStrings = {
        NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(PK11_GetTokenName(mSlot))};
    rv = PIPBundleFormatStringFromName("CertSecurityDeviceAuthenticationPrompt",
                                       formatStrings, promptString);
  }
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return rv;
  }

  nsString password;
  bool userClickedOK = false;
  rv = prompt->PromptPassword(nullptr, promptString.get(),
                              getter_Copies(password), &userClickedOK);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !userClickedOK) {
    return rv;
  }

  mResult = ToNewUTF8String(password);
  return NS_OK;
}

char* PK11PasswordPrompt(PK11SlotInfo* slot, PRBool /*retry*/, void* arg) {
  if (!slot) {
    return nullptr;
  }
  RefPtr<PK11PasswordPromptRunnable> runnable(new PK11PasswordPromptRunnable(
      slot, static_cast<nsIInterfaceRequestor*>(arg)));
  MOZ_ALWAYS_SUCCEEDS(SyncRunnable::DispatchToThread(
      GetMainThreadSerialEventTarget(), runnable));
  return runnable->mResult;
}

nsCString getKeaGroupName(uint32_t aKeaGroup) {
  nsCString groupName;
  switch (aKeaGroup) {
    case ssl_grp_ec_secp256r1:
      groupName = "P256"_ns;
      break;
    case ssl_grp_ec_secp384r1:
      groupName = "P384"_ns;
      break;
    case ssl_grp_ec_secp521r1:
      groupName = "P521"_ns;
      break;
    case ssl_grp_ec_curve25519:
      groupName = "x25519"_ns;
      break;
    case ssl_grp_kem_xyber768d00:
      groupName = "xyber768d00"_ns;
      break;
    case ssl_grp_kem_mlkem768x25519:
      groupName = "mlkem768x25519"_ns;
      break;
    case ssl_grp_kem_secp256r1mlkem768:
      groupName = "secp256r1mlkem768"_ns;
      break;
    case ssl_grp_kem_secp384r1mlkem1024:
      groupName = "secp384r1mlkem1024"_ns;
      break;
    case ssl_grp_kem_mlkem1024:
      groupName = "mlkem1024"_ns;
      break;
    case ssl_grp_ffdhe_2048:
      groupName = "FF 2048"_ns;
      break;
    case ssl_grp_ffdhe_3072:
      groupName = "FF 3072"_ns;
      break;
    case ssl_grp_none:
      groupName = "none"_ns;
      break;
    case ssl_grp_ffdhe_custom:
      groupName = "custom"_ns;
      break;
    // All other groups are not enabled in Firefox. See namedGroups in
    // nsNSSIOLayer.cpp.
    default:
      // This really shouldn't happen!
      MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("Invalid key exchange group.");
      groupName = "unknown group"_ns;
  }
  return groupName;
}

nsCString getSignatureName(uint32_t aSignatureScheme) {
  nsCString signatureName;
  switch (aSignatureScheme) {
    case ssl_sig_none:
      signatureName = "none"_ns;
      break;
    case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5:
      signatureName = "RSA-PKCS1-SHA1MD5"_ns;
      break;

#define ENABLED_SCHEME(SCHEME, NAME) \
  case SCHEME:                       \
    signatureName = NAME##_ns;       \
    break;

      FOR_EACH_ENABLED_SIGNATURE_SCHEME(ENABLED_SCHEME);

#undef ENABLED_SCHEME

    // All other groups are not enabled in Firefox. See sEnabledSignatureSchemes
    // in nsNSSIOLayer.cpp.
    default:
      // This really shouldn't happen!
      MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("Invalid signature scheme.");
      signatureName = "unknown signature"_ns;
  }
  return signatureName;
}

static void PreliminaryHandshakeDone(PRFileDesc* fd) {
  NSSSocketControl* socketControl = (NSSSocketControl*)fd->higher->secret;
  if (!socketControl) {
    return;
  }
  if (socketControl->IsPreliminaryHandshakeDone()) {
    return;
  }

  SSLChannelInfo channelInfo;
  if (SSL_GetChannelInfo(fd, &channelInfo, sizeof(channelInfo)) != SECSuccess) {
    return;
  }
  SSLCipherSuiteInfo cipherInfo;
  if (SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channelInfo.cipherSuite, &cipherInfo,
                             sizeof(cipherInfo)) != SECSuccess) {
    return;
  }
  socketControl->SetPreliminaryHandshakeInfo(channelInfo, cipherInfo);
  socketControl->SetSSLVersionUsed(channelInfo.protocolVersion);
  socketControl->SetEarlyDataAccepted(channelInfo.earlyDataAccepted);
  socketControl->SetKEAUsed(channelInfo.keaType);
  socketControl->SetKEAKeyBits(channelInfo.keaKeyBits);
  socketControl->SetMACAlgorithmUsed(cipherInfo.macAlgorithm);

  // Get the NPN value.
  SSLNextProtoState state;
  unsigned char npnbuf[256];
  unsigned int npnlen;

  if (SSL_GetNextProto(fd, &state, npnbuf, &npnlen,
                       AssertedCast<unsigned int>(std::size(npnbuf))) ==
      SECSuccess) {
    if (state == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NEGOTIATED ||
        state == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_SELECTED) {
      socketControl->SetNegotiatedNPN(
          BitwiseCast<char*, unsigned char*>(npnbuf), npnlen);
    } else {
      socketControl->SetNegotiatedNPN(nullptr, 0);
    }
    glean::tls::npn_type.EnumGet(static_cast<glean::tls::NpnTypeLabel>(state))
        .Add();
  } else {
    socketControl->SetNegotiatedNPN(nullptr, 0);
  }

  socketControl->SetPreliminaryHandshakeDone();
}

SECStatus CanFalseStartCallback(PRFileDesc* fd, void* client_data,
                                PRBool* canFalseStart) {
  *canFalseStart = false;

  NSSSocketControl* infoObject = (NSSSocketControl*)fd->higher->secret;
  if (!infoObject) {
    PR_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR, 0);
    return SECFailure;
  }

  infoObject->SetFalseStartCallbackCalled();

  PreliminaryHandshakeDone(fd);

  uint32_t reasonsForNotFalseStarting = 0;

  SSLChannelInfo channelInfo;
  if (SSL_GetChannelInfo(fd, &channelInfo, sizeof(channelInfo)) != SECSuccess) {
    return SECSuccess;
  }

  SSLCipherSuiteInfo cipherInfo;
  if (SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channelInfo.cipherSuite, &cipherInfo,
                             sizeof(cipherInfo)) != SECSuccess) {
    MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
            ("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] failed - "
             " KEA %d\n",
             fd, static_cast<int32_t>(channelInfo.keaType)));
    return SECSuccess;
  }

  // Prevent version downgrade attacks from TLS 1.2, and avoid False Start for
  // TLS 1.3 and later. See Bug 861310 for all the details as to why.
  if (channelInfo.protocolVersion != SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
    MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
            ("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] failed - "
             "SSL Version must be TLS 1.2, was %x\n",
             fd, static_cast<int32_t>(channelInfo.protocolVersion)));
    reasonsForNotFalseStarting |= POSSIBLE_VERSION_DOWNGRADE;
  }

  // See bug 952863 for why ECDHE is allowed, but DHE (and RSA) are not.
  // Also note that ecdh_hybrid groups are not supported in TLS 1.2 and are out
  // of scope.
  if (channelInfo.keaType != ssl_kea_ecdh) {
    MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
            ("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] failed - "
             "unsupported KEA %d\n",
             fd, static_cast<int32_t>(channelInfo.keaType)));
    reasonsForNotFalseStarting |= KEA_NOT_SUPPORTED;
  }

  // Prevent downgrade attacks on the symmetric cipher. We do not allow CBC
  // mode due to BEAST, POODLE, and other attacks on the MAC-then-Encrypt
  // design. See bug 1109766 for more details.
  if (cipherInfo.macAlgorithm != ssl_mac_aead) {
    MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
            ("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] failed - non-AEAD cipher used, %d, "
             "is not supported with False Start.\n",
             fd, static_cast<int32_t>(cipherInfo.symCipher)));
    reasonsForNotFalseStarting |= POSSIBLE_CIPHER_SUITE_DOWNGRADE;
  }

  // XXX: An attacker can choose which protocols are advertised in the
  // NPN extension. TODO(Bug 861311): We should restrict the ability
  // of an attacker leverage this capability by restricting false start
  // to the same protocol we previously saw for the server, after the
  // first successful connection to the server.

  glean::tls::reasons_for_not_false_starting
      .EnumGet(static_cast<glean::tls::ReasonsForNotFalseStartingLabel>(
          reasonsForNotFalseStarting))
      .Add();

  if (reasonsForNotFalseStarting == 0) {
    *canFalseStart = PR_TRUE;
    infoObject->SetFalseStarted();
    infoObject->NoteTimeUntilReady();
    MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
            ("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] ok\n", fd));
  }

  return SECSuccess;
}

static void AccumulateCipherSuite(const SSLChannelInfo& channelInfo) {
  uint32_t value;
  // Note: this list must include every cipher suite it is possible to enable
  // in nsNSSComponent.cpp (see sCipherPrefs and sDeprecatedTLS1CipherPrefs).
  switch (channelInfo.cipherSuite) {
    case TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:  // 0x000A
      value = 1;
      break;
    case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:  // 0x002F
      value = 2;
      break;
    case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:  // 0x0033
      value = 3;
      break;
    case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:  // 0x0035
      value = 4;
      break;
    case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:  // 0x0039
      value = 5;
      break;
    case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:  // 0x009C
      value = 6;
      break;
    case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:  // 0x009D
      value = 7;
      break;
    case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:  // 0xC009
      value = 8;
      break;
    case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:  // 0xC00A
      value = 9;
      break;
    case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:  // 0xC013
      value = 10;
      break;
    case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:  // 0xC014
      value = 11;
      break;
    case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:  // 0xC02B
      value = 12;
      break;
    case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:  // 0xC02C
      value = 13;
      break;
    case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:  // 0xC02F
      value = 14;
      break;
    case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:  // 0xC030
      value = 15;
      break;
    case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:  // 0xCCA8
      value = 16;
      break;
    case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:  // 0xCCA9
      value = 17;
      break;

    // TLS 1.3 cipher suites
    case TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:  // 0x1301
      value = 18;
      break;
    case TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:  // 0x1302
      value = 19;
      break;
    case TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:  // 0x1303
      value = 20;
      break;

    // unknown
    default:
      value = 0;
      break;
  }
  MOZ_ASSERT(value != 0);
  glean::tls::cipher_suite.AccumulateSingleSample(value);
}

const nsLiteralCString KeyExchangeAlgorithmNameFromType(SSLKEAType keaType) {
  switch (keaType) {
    case ssl_kea_rsa:
      return "rsa"_ns;
      break;
    case ssl_kea_dh:
      return "dh"_ns;
      break;
    case ssl_kea_dh_psk:
      return "dh_psk"_ns;
      break;
    case ssl_kea_ecdh:
      return "ecdh"_ns;
      break;
    case ssl_kea_ecdh_psk:
      return "ecdh_psk"_ns;
      break;
    case ssl_kea_ecdh_hybrid:
      return "ecdh_hybrid"_ns;
      break;
    case ssl_kea_ecdh_hybrid_psk:
      return "ecdh_hybrid_psk"_ns;
      break;
    case ssl_kea_kem:
      return "kem"_ns;
      break;
    case ssl_kea_kem_psk:
      return "kem_psk"_ns;
      break;
    default:
      MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("unhandled key exchange algorithm");
      return "__other__"_ns;
      break;
  }
}

glean::tls::KeaEcdheCurveLabel ECDHECurveLabelFromNamedGroup(
    SSLNamedGroup namedGroup) {
  switch (namedGroup) {
    case ssl_grp_ec_secp256r1:
      return glean::tls::KeaEcdheCurveLabel::eP256;
    case ssl_grp_ec_secp384r1:
      return glean::tls::KeaEcdheCurveLabel::eP384;
    case ssl_grp_ec_secp521r1:
      return glean::tls::KeaEcdheCurveLabel::eP521;
    case ssl_grp_ec_curve25519:
      return glean::tls::KeaEcdheCurveLabel::eCurve25519;
    default:
      MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("unhandled or invalid group");
      return glean::tls::KeaEcdheCurveLabel::e__Other__;
  }
}

// In terms of ECDSA, only keys on secp256r1, secp384r1, or secp521r1 may be
// present in the server certificate, and thus there should be a 1-to-1
// relationship between the bit length of the auth key and the curve. If other
// curves are ever accepted in server certificates in the future, this property
// may not hold.
glean::tls::AuthEcdsaCurveLabel AuthCurveLabelFromBitLength(
    uint32_t curveLengthBits) {
  switch (curveLengthBits) {
    case 256:
      return glean::tls::AuthEcdsaCurveLabel::eP256;
    case 384:
      return glean::tls::AuthEcdsaCurveLabel::eP384;
    case 521:
      return glean::tls::AuthEcdsaCurveLabel::eP521;
    default:
      MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("unhandled or invalid ecdsa auth curve size");
      return glean::tls::AuthEcdsaCurveLabel::e__Other__;
  }
}

void HandshakeCallback(PRFileDesc* fd, void* client_data) {
  // Do the bookkeeping that needs to be done after the
  // server's ServerHello...ServerHelloDone have been processed, but that
  // doesn't need the handshake to be completed.
  PreliminaryHandshakeDone(fd);

  NSSSocketControl* infoObject = (NSSSocketControl*)fd->higher->secret;

  SSLVersionRange versions(infoObject->GetTLSVersionRange());
  MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
          ("[%p] HandshakeCallback: succeeded using TLS version range "
           "(0x%04x,0x%04x)\n",
           fd, static_cast<unsigned int>(versions.min),
           static_cast<unsigned int>(versions.max)));
  // If the handshake completed, then we know the site is TLS tolerant
  infoObject->RememberTLSTolerant();

  SSLChannelInfo channelInfo;
  SECStatus rv = SSL_GetChannelInfo(fd, &channelInfo, sizeof(channelInfo));
  MOZ_ASSERT(rv == SECSuccess);
  if (rv != SECSuccess) {
    return;
  }
  AccumulateCipherSuite(channelInfo);

  // Get the protocol version for telemetry
  // 1=tls1, 2=tls1.1, 3=tls1.2, 4=tls1.3
  unsigned int versionEnum = channelInfo.protocolVersion & 0xFF;
  MOZ_ASSERT(versionEnum > 0);
  glean::tls_handshake::version
      .EnumGet(static_cast<glean::tls_handshake::VersionLabel>(versionEnum - 1))
      .Add();

  SSLCipherSuiteInfo cipherInfo;
  rv = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channelInfo.cipherSuite, &cipherInfo,
                              sizeof cipherInfo);
  MOZ_ASSERT(rv == SECSuccess);
  if (rv != SECSuccess) {
    return;
  }

  glean::tls::key_exchange_algorithm
      .Get(infoObject->IsFullHandshake() ? "full"_ns : "resumed"_ns,
           KeyExchangeAlgorithmNameFromType(channelInfo.keaType))
      .Add();

  if (infoObject->IsFullHandshake()) {
    if (channelInfo.keaType == ssl_kea_ecdh) {
      glean::tls::kea_ecdhe_curve
          .EnumGet(ECDHECurveLabelFromNamedGroup(channelInfo.keaGroup))
          .Add();
    }

    glean::tls::auth_algorithm
        .EnumGet(
            static_cast<glean::tls::AuthAlgorithmLabel>(channelInfo.authType))
        .Add();

    // RSA key exchange doesn't use a signature for auth.
    if (channelInfo.keaType != ssl_kea_rsa &&
        channelInfo.authType == ssl_auth_ecdsa) {
      glean::tls::auth_ecdsa_curve
          .EnumGet(AuthCurveLabelFromBitLength(channelInfo.authKeyBits))
          .Add();
    }
  }

  PRBool siteSupportsSafeRenego;
  if (channelInfo.protocolVersion != SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
    rv = SSL_HandshakeNegotiatedExtension(fd, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn,
                                          &siteSupportsSafeRenego);
    MOZ_ASSERT(rv == SECSuccess);
    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
      siteSupportsSafeRenego = false;
    }
  } else {
    // TLS 1.3 dropped support for renegotiation.
    siteSupportsSafeRenego = true;
  }
  bool renegotiationUnsafe =
      !siteSupportsSafeRenego &&
      StaticPrefs::security_ssl_treat_unsafe_negotiation_as_broken();

  bool deprecatedTlsVer =
      (channelInfo.protocolVersion < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);

  uint32_t state;
  if (renegotiationUnsafe || deprecatedTlsVer) {
    state = nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_BROKEN;
  } else {
    state = nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_SECURE;
    SSLVersionRange defVersion;
    rv = SSL_VersionRangeGetDefault(ssl_variant_stream, &defVersion);
    if (rv == SECSuccess && versions.max >= defVersion.max) {
      // we know this site no longer requires a version fallback
      infoObject->RemoveInsecureTLSFallback();
    }
  }

  if (infoObject->HasServerCert()) {
    MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
            ("HandshakeCallback KEEPING existing cert\n"));
  } else {
    infoObject->RebuildCertificateInfoFromSSLTokenCache();
  }

  // Check if the user has added an override for a certificate error.
  if (infoObject->HasUserOverriddenCertificateError()) {
    state |= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_CERT_USER_OVERRIDDEN;
  }

  infoObject->SetSecurityState(state);

  // XXX Bug 883674: We shouldn't be formatting messages here in PSM; instead,
  // we should set a flag on the channel that higher (UI) level code can check
  // to log the warning. In particular, these warnings should go to the web
  // console instead of to the error console. Also, the warning is not
  // localized.
  if (!siteSupportsSafeRenego) {
    NS_ConvertASCIItoUTF16 msg(infoObject->GetHostName());
    msg.AppendLiteral(" : server does not support RFC 5746, see CVE-2009-3555");

    nsContentUtils::LogSimpleConsoleError(
        msg, "SSL"_ns, infoObject->GetOriginAttributes().IsPrivateBrowsing(),
        true /* from chrome context */);
  }

  infoObject->NoteTimeUntilReady();
  infoObject->SetHandshakeCompleted();
}